ASME NQA.TR pdf free download

ASME NQA.TR pdf free download Evolution of Quality Assurance Principles and Requirements in the U.S. Nuclear Industry
In 2013, NNSA replaced QC-1 with NNSA NAP-24. NAP- 24 restructured QC-1 into the standard DOE directive format. It referenced the NNSA supplemental and DOE directives for control of measuring and test equipment and records ratherthanexplicitlyincludingthese require- ments. Additionally, DOE O 414.1D, Attachment 4, replaced the software quality requirements for safety- and weapons-related software previously in QC-1. NAP-24 was revised in 2015 to include Attachment 3, which defined common processes and activities for the federal and NNSA contractor (both design agencies and production agencies) weapon quality organizations, employing a layered oversight approach involving Head- quarters Weapon Quality Division, field/production offices, and NNSA contractors and subcontractors.
1.3 AEC NAVAL REACTORS, AEC QRC-82C Quality control requirements for AEC naval nuclear propulsion programs were prescribed in AEC QRC-82C. This document supplemented MIL-Q-9858A by imposing quality control requirements for material inspection and testing during manufacturing of naval reactor compo- nents.
1.4 AEC TO DOE RDT F2-2T STANDARD From its beginning, the AEC managed and operated its civilian reactor and technology developmentprograms as a decentralized agency. AEC headquarters developed policy, managed funding, and issued broad programmatic direction to its field organizations. The AEC issued grants to universities, national laboratories, and research and development contractors. Notwithstandingthe good operational safetyrecords in the late 1960s, AEC RDT managementand engineers were disturbed to note thatimportantcivilian reactorand tech- nology development objectives were not being accoplished as planned. Quality problems, including equipment failures and irretrievable loss of important data, were attributed not to the inherent risks of technology development but to insufficient management and engineering attention to conventional material and processcontrols.Fundamental,exactingengineeringstandards and quality controls that were essential to technology development were not being applied. Early AEC, DOE, and contractor project management misconceptions about quality assurance included the following:
(a) Some project managers believed it was possible to ensure nuclear facility quality without a formal, documented, and integrated quality assurance program. While this approach was used for small basic research reactors, quality-related operating problems resulted in shutting down production reactors at most DOE sites and prevented their restart.
(b) Some projectmanagers believed thatqualityassur- ance program establishmentand implementation was the primary responsibility and role of the quality assurance organization. This misconception was fostered in part by some quality assurance organizations that believed that the quality assurance plans, requirements, and proce- dures were written by and for the quality assurance or- ganization. Theyfailed to recognize a fundamental quality assurance principle that quality and its achievement are primary management responsibilities; the quality assur- ance organization supports top and line management in executing their quality assurance programs and by conducting independent audits. Prior to 1968, there were no formal quality assurance requirements imposed by the AEC and its management and operating contractors on GOCO nuclear facilities conducting reactor development and technology activ- ities. This situation presented an early quality manage- ment dichotomy for the National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA) quality engineers who had technical and quality management oversight of some joint AEC–NASA space exploration programs. For example, in the mid-1960s, NASA’s Space Nuclear Auxiliary Power (SNAP) programs imposed rigorous quality assurance and quality control requirements from NASANHB 5300.4(1B) on some ofits prime contrac- tors,e.g.,AerojetGeneralinAzusa,CA,andGeneralElectric inEvendale, OH. InMIL-I-45208A, NASAdelegatedto DOD Air Force, Navy, and other contract administration agen- cies certain DOD inspection system requirements fornon- nuclear, non-mission-critical components of the power conversion system being developed by the contractor. NASA quality assurance program managers were disap- pointed to learn that the AEC did not impose any formal quality assurance or quality control requirements on the SNAP reactor-system-development contractors. The Associate Director at NASA’s Lewis Research Center brought this situation to the attention of the joint AEC–NASA organization.